On the Imputation of Adam's First Sin · §400

Man. Post. Cap. VII: Two claudications; Rom 5; organs; Chamier voluntary

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It irks me to linger longer in that scholastic dust of empty subtleties with which you have entangled me by Thomas's work—whom otherwise I could scatter back to his authors with the little stories of many reasons: but it will be enough here to have noted two limps of this likeness. First: an act exercised through some bodily member has the nature of fault from the whole man's will, not that member's, because that member has no proper will of its own. But each man has his own proper will. So a separated member sins nothing, does nothing. Individual men do and sin many things separated from Adam, and their actions are sins not because they proceed from Adam's will, but because, proceeding from each one's own will, they clash with God's law. Next I would learn why this comparison holds only respecting that first actual sin, not the following ones: did Adam's will cease to be nature's will, or Adam to be human nature's principle, the moment he sinned? Then this comparison would make Adam's later sins no less imputed to us than the first—contradicting the Apostle, Rom. 5. I add a third limp: members' actions have fault from the whole man's will because the body's members are organs or instruments of the whole man's will and are moved by his command; so their actions are ascribed to the person's will as principal cause, to the members only as instrumental. But we, I think, are not Adam's organs, nor are we moved by Adam's will, nor are our actions commanded by him, nor when someone generates does he do it as an instrumental cause obeying Adam's will. Besides all these defects I have mentioned, this likeness and reasoning of Thomas Aquinas labors under another and greatest vice. For it in no way satisfies the difficulty proposed. I can press what the most learned Chamier also presses against Pighius and Salmeron. I will copy his words: When sin is said to be voluntary, it is to be understood of the will of him whose sin it is said to be. But in that sense Adam's sin cannot be said to be voluntary in us, much less an act of our will. For it is neither in our will nor from our will: because in very deed our will never was Adam's will. If therefore Adam's sin is not voluntary with respect to our will, but only with respect to Adam's will, certainly it is not our sin, but Adam's alone.

Latin

Piget me diutius immorari in isto scholastico pulvere inanium subtilitatum, quibus tu me Thomae opera implicuisti, quem alioqui fabellis plurium rationum possem in suos autores dispellere, & dissipare: sed satis erit hoc loco duas huius similitudinis claudicationes observasse. Primum enim ideo actus per membrum aliquod corporis exercitus non habet rationem culpae ex voluntate illius membri, sed totius hominis, quia membro illi nulla est propria voluntas. At sua cuique homini propria est voluntas. Itaque membrum separatum nihil peccat, nihil agit. Homines singuli multa & agunt, & peccant separati ab Adamo, eorumque actiones peccata sunt, non quia proficiscuntur a voluntate Adami, sed quia, profectae a propria cuiusque voluntate, pugnant cum lege Dei. Deinde discere velim, cur haec comparatio locum habeat duntaxat respectu primi illius peccati actualis, non autem sequentium? desiitne simul ac peccavit Adamus, eius voluntas esse voluntas naturae, aut Adamus esse principium naturae humanae? Effecerit igitur ista comparatio, ut, non minus quam primum, reliqua Adami peccata nobis imputentur, contradicente Apostolo Rom. 5. Addam & tertiam claudicationem, idcirco actiones membrorum corporis rationem culpae habent ex voluntate totius hominis, quoniam membra corporis sunt voluntatis totius hominis organa, seu instrumenta, & eius imperio moventur; quo fit ut eorum actiones tribuantur voluntati personae ut causae principali, membris tantummodo ut causae instrumentali. Nos autem, opinor, organa non sumus Adami, nec movemur a voluntate Adami, nec ab eo imperantur actiones nostrae, nec, cum quis generat, id facit ut causa instrumentalis, Adami voluntati obsequens. Praeter hos omnes defectus quos memoravi, laborat alio vitio haec Thomae Aquinatis similitudo & ratiocinatio, eoque maximo. Non enim propositae difficultati ullo modo satisfacit. Urgere enim id possum, quod etiam doctissimus Chamierus adversus Pighium & Salmeronem urget. Eius verba ascribam: Cum peccatum dicitur esse voluntarium, intelligendum est de voluntate eius, cuius peccatum esse dicitur. At hoc certe sensu non potest dici in nobis peccatum illud Adami esse voluntarium, multo minus actus nostrae voluntatis. Neque enim est in nostra voluntate, neque a nostra voluntate: quia reipsa nostra voluntas nunquam fuit voluntas Adami. Si ergo nostrae voluntatis respectu voluntarium non est Adami peccatum, sed tantum respectu voluntatis Adami, certe nostrum peccatum non est, sed solius Adami.

About this text

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English follows the locked 1661 Saumur Latin of Capita I–XIV partial through Man. Post. Caput IX (eph-ho / eph-ho pantes) before eph-ho / eph-ho pantes, reconstructed from IA PDF page images with Vision OCR and pdftotext as check. No modern English was copied. Cap. IX deepen+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

IA deimputationepri00lapl. Densify: Capita I–XII + Caput XIV + Man. Post. Cap. II–VI through Cap. X Rom. 5:14 tip. Not whole Disputatio; Cap. X Rom. 5:14+ / ~494 pp Disputatio remain.

Witnesses

This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.