On the Imputation of Adam's First Sin · §238

Man. Post. Cap. IV: PLAC — dilemma; passio ≠ privatio; expulsio

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Placeus. This answer also misses my minor. When I said privation of righteousness is breach of the condition or precept, I meant actual privation as actual breach, habitual privation as habitual breach. Garissoles scarcely allows habitual sin a place. Calling my Theses "boasting" I cannot see what handle I gave him. I split what he joined and used this dilemma.

If righteousness is forensic, do we not lose it by the very fact of breaking the law? I see nothing to fault there. If moral: was righteousness not expelled from Adam by the very change that introduced the contrary corruption—as darkening drives out light, or cooling heat? If he takes me to mean law-breaking is only the meritorious cause of privation, he grants it; were that all I meant I would contradict myself, since I argue that privation of original righteousness is not punishment properly so called. Law-breaking is injustice—privation of righteousness—actual if act or omission, habitual if habit; we break the law by habit as well as by act.

He does not prove they differ "not at all." I only need my proposition true whether subject and attribute are identical or differ somewhat—as "man is an animal" and "man is risible" remain true though subject and attribute differ more than in names. "Law-breaking is an action"—every breach? Not habitual; nor actual omission. He says privation is a passion, yet had just split privation into active and passive. Is active privation a passion? Unlikely. Is "passive" a passion when said of God, who suffers nothing? Formally privation is not passion but reduces to the predicament of the form it negates—so the logicians. Passion passes with action; privation remains. Passion is a real being in a predicament; privation is rather a negation, in a predicament only reductively.

As for God creating souls bare of original righteousness without making them transgressors: he creates them without righteousness, yet is not author of that privation—they contract it from the body; else by stripping them he would make them unjust, and in a capable subject there is no middle between just and unjust. "Expulsion precedes corruption"? Expulsion presupposes righteousness already in the subject; original righteousness was only in Adam, so only from him was it expelled. Who believes God expels righteousness and then is angry because it is gone—or causes the privation yet not the corruption? That is like saying who takes straightness from a body does not cause crookedness, or who takes health does not cause disease. Moral corruption and privation of righteousness cannot stand or be thought apart. Whether they oppose privatively or contrarily, they drive each other out of the same capable subject at once; there is no middle between justice and injustice, virtue and vice, straight and crooked, in a capable subject.

Latin

PLAC. Aberrat etiam haec responsio ab argumenti mei propositione minore. Cum enim dixi, privationem justitiae esse violationem conditionis seu praecepti, id ita accipi debuit, ut privatio justitiae actualis esse intelligeretur violatio actualis, & privatio justitiae habitualis, violatio habitualis. Sed videtur habituale peccatum Vir Doctus nullo fere loco habere. Itaque non frustra est quod me jactasse dicit in Thesibus: quo verbo, seu jactationem seu jactantiam significet, cur uteretur quam ei ansam praebuerim non possum videre. Divisi autem quae conjunxit, hocque dilemmate sum usus. Si justitia sumitur sensu forensi, nonne ea privamur hoc ipso quod legem transgredimur? In hoc dilemmatis membro quid reprehendat, aut reprehendi possit, non intelligo. Sequitur alterum; Si sensu morali: Annon hac ipsa mutatione, qua corruptio contraria justitiae in Adamum introducta est, ab eodem expulsa est justitia, haud aliter quam obtenebratione aeris expellitur lumen, aut frigesactione calor? In his quoque verbis meis quid reprehendit? Si intelligo transgressionem legis esse causam meritoriam privationis justitiae facile agnoscit. Hoc vero si intelligerem mecum ipse pugnarem, qui hoc, de quo agitur, argumentum affero, ut probem privationem justitiae originalis non esse poenam proprie dictam. Certe transgressio legis injustitia seu privatio justitiae est; justitia, inquam, actualis si est actio vel actionis omissio, habitualis vero si est habitus: transgredimur enim legem non solum actione, sed etiam habitu. Si puto transgressionem legis & privationem justitiae nihil inter se differre omnino, non probat. Ego vero nihil aliud volo, quam ut propositio mea vera sit, sive attributum & subjectum nihil omnino differant, sive differant nonnihil. Nam propositiones, homo est animal, homo est risibilis, verae sunt, quamvis subjectum & attributum plusquam nominibus differant. Sed quomodo probat differre? transgressio, inquit, legis est actio. Omnisne transgressio? non habitualis, ut opinor, nec ea actualis, quae in omissione actionis consistit. Sed pergat. Privatio justitiae passio est. At modo distinguebat privationem in activam & passivam. Est-ne igitur privatio activa passio? non sit veri simile. Passiva quoque, estne passio? at dicitur respectu Dei qui omnis passionis est expers. Certe privatio formaliter non est passio, sed reducitur ad praedicamentum formae seu termini cujus est negatio. Hoc docent omnes Logici. Passio non minus quam actio transit; Privatio vero permanet, etiam postquam actio & passio desierunt esse. Passio formaliter est ens reale, & per se est in praedicamento, privatio nec formaliter est ens sed negatio potius, nec in praedicamento nisi reductive. Mitto alias differentias inter passionem & privationem. Addo posita actione, cujus terminus sit accidens, poni necessario passionem; hancque ab illa non realiter differre, sed respectu tantum & ratione. Quod subjungit, Deus animas hominum creare justitiae originalis decoramento destitutas, qui tamen creando non facit legis praevaricatrices, illud quale sit considerari oportet. Nam creat quidem animas justitia privatas, sed sic tamen, ut hujus privationis autor non sit, eam ipsae contrahant a corpore. Alioquin enim eas, si privaret justitia, faceret injustas. Nam inter justum & injustum, sanctum & pollutum in subjecto capaci nullum est medium. Quid porro est, quod addit, Sic expulsio justitiae est antecedens ad corruptionem, & corruptio consequens ad expulsionem justitiae? Primo enim expulsio justitiae, praesupponit justitiam praeexistentem in subjecto unde expellitur. Non fuit autem originalis justitia nisi in solo Adamo. Ab eo igitur solo expulsa est. Deinde quis credat Deum ab homine justitiam expellere, ac propterea quod ab eo expulsa sit, ei irasci? Item Deum causam esse privationis justitiae, nec tamen esse causam corruptionis? Perinde enim est, ac si eum dicerem, qui tollit a corpore rectitudinem, non esse causam obliquitatis, aut qui tollit a corpore humano sanitatem, morbi causam non esse. Mihi quidem certe videtur nec corruptio moralis absque privatione justitiae, nec privatio justitiae absque corruptione morali consistere ullo modo, aut intelligi posse. Nam sive privative justitia & corruptio opponuntur, haec illius privatio est; sive contrarie, expellunt sese mutuo ex eodem subjecto capaci, & quidem immediate. Nullum enim medium concipi animo potest inter justitiam & injustitiam, virtutem & vitium, rectitudinem & obliquitatem &c. in subjecto capaci.

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English follows the locked 1661 Saumur Latin of Capita I–XIV partial through Man. Post. Caput IX (eph-ho / eph-ho pantes) before eph-ho / eph-ho pantes, reconstructed from IA PDF page images with Vision OCR and pdftotext as check. No modern English was copied. Cap. IX deepen+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

IA deimputationepri00lapl. Densify: Capita I–XII + Caput XIV + Man. Post. Cap. II–VI through Cap. X Rom. 5:14 tip. Not whole Disputatio; Cap. X Rom. 5:14+ / ~494 pp Disputatio remain.

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