On the Imputation of Adam's First Sin · §183

Man. Post. Cap. II §XVII: Placeus — immediate/mediate better than common/singular

Placeus: If the two distinctions match, why invent a new and awkward one instead of resting in the received, convenient one? The split into immediate and mediate is better than into common and singular. First, Hunnius and Walaeus had already used the former; who had used the latter? Second, the former divides into members opposed not only in the thing but in the name—the mark of a good distinction, missing here. For that singular imputation can be called common, and the common singular. Are not human nature, hereditary corruption, existence, and the rest common to all men? Yet singular, proper, personal imputation is no less common than human nature, corruption, or existence (Christ always excepted)—so how is it the opposite of common imputation? Opposed members each negate the other. Again, common imputation can itself be called singular, proper, and personal if common is taken distributively: it is said of each of Adam's posterity one by one. If common is taken collectively, both should have been called common—one collectively, one distributively. What is common to Adam's posterity collectively can be said of the whole collection, but of each member not at all—just as it was common to the Apostles collectively to be twelve, and therefore none of them was twelve. Further, since by imputation the learned man means either a Judge's act declaring someone guilty and worthy of punishment, or the infliction of punishment itself, the infliction is plainly singular: whether corruption, bodily death, or eternal death, it falls on individuals. If common imputation is infliction of punishment, it is singular. To that infliction answers condemnation—the Judge's declaration that someone is guilty and worthy of punishment. In what sense, then, is imputation called common and opposed to singular? In the sense in which common or universal is opposed to singular? Then common imputation differs from singular only as species from its individual. But a species exists only in some individual; outside or before its individuals it is sought in vain. Yet the learned man wants common imputation to have existed long before—and outside—the singular. I pass other differences. If he opposed common to singular in some sense usage does not bear, he affected singularity and obscurity, and wrote for himself rather than the reader. Add that the common ought to be more common than the singular—why else oppose that name to this?—yet it is not more common unless you make it common even to men who never were and never will be. One more point must not be skipped. From his proof that singular, proper, personal imputation is later than the corruption inherent in us, it follows that Adam's sin is imputed to the posterity by that common imputation before they are sons of Adam or counted as such. How that can be true and just I leave you, prudent reader, to weigh.

Latin

PLAC. Si paria facit, cur non contentus illa distinctione jam recepta & commoda excogitavit novam & incommodam? Melior enim est imputationis distinctio in immediatam & mediatam, quam in communem & singularem. Primo quia illa jam fuerat usurpata ab Aegidio Hunnio & Walaeo, haec vero a quo fuerat usurpata? Deinde, quia illa est in membra non re modo, sed nomine etiam opposita; quae bonae distinctionis nota in hac desideratur. Nam imputatio illa singularis dici potest communis, & vice versa communis singularis. Quid enim? nonne humana natura, corruptio haereditaria, existentia, &c. sunt omnium hominum communes? Atqui imputatio singularis, propria, personalis non minus communis est quam natura humana, quam corruptio, quam existentia (Christum semper excipio) quomodo ergo imputationi communi opponitur? Nam membrorum oppositorum alterum alterius negationem importat. Rursus imputatio communis potest etiam ipsa dici singularis, propria, personalis, siquidem communis dicitur distributive: de singulis enim personis posterorum Adae singulatim praedicatur. Quod si dicitur communis collective, utraque dici debuit communis, altera collective, altera distributive. Deinde quod commune est collective posteris Adami, id quidem de tota collectione posterorum ejus praedicari potest, sed de iis singulis, nullo modo; sicut Apostolis commune fuit collective esse duodecim; ac propterea eorum nullus fuit duodecim. Praeterea, cum per imputationem vir doctus intelligat, vel actum Judicis declarantis aliquem reum, poenaque dignum, vel ipsam poenae inflictionem, palam est inflictionem poenae esse singularem: seu enim illa sit corruptio, seu mors corporis vel aeterna, infligitur singulis. Si igitur imputatio communis est poenae inflictio, utique singularis est. Inflictioni autem poenae respondet condemnatio, seu declaratio Judicis aliquem esse reum & poena dignum. Quaero etiam, quo sensu imputatio dicatur communis & opponatur singulari? An quo sensu solet commune seu universale opponi singulari? Non differt ergo imputatio communis a singulari, nisi ut species ab individuo suo. Non est autem species nisi in aliquo individuo suo. Extra aut ante individua sua frustra quaeritur. Attamen vult Vir doctus imputationem communem diu antequam esset singularis, adeoque extra singularem fuisse. Mitto alia discrimina. Quod si alio sensu, quam fert usus, communem singulari Vir doctus opposuit, singularitatem ipse & obscuritatem affectavit, sibique potius quam Lectori scripsit. Adde quod communis videtur magis communis esse debere quam singularis: alioqui cur id nomen huic opponitur? Attamen non est magis communis, nisi velis etiam iis communem esse hominibus, qui nunquam fuerunt, nec futuri sunt. Plura non addam; nisi hoc unum, quod praetermitti non debet. Ex ratione Viri docti, qua probat imputationem singularem, propriam, personalem corruptione nobis inhaerente posteriorem esse, sequi, imputari posteris peccatum Adae imputatione illa communi, antequam sint filii Adae, & pro filiis Adae habeantur. Quod quomodo verum & justum esse possit, tibi prudens Lector, considerandum relinquo.

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English follows the locked 1661 Saumur Latin of Capita I–XIV partial through Man. Post. Caput IX (eph-ho / eph-ho pantes) before eph-ho / eph-ho pantes, reconstructed from IA PDF page images with Vision OCR and pdftotext as check. No modern English was copied. Cap. IX deepen+ remain.

Catalogue & scope

IA deimputationepri00lapl. Densify: Capita I–XII + Caput XIV + Man. Post. Cap. II–VI through Cap. X Rom. 5:14 tip. Not whole Disputatio; Cap. X Rom. 5:14+ / ~494 pp Disputatio remain.

Witnesses

This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.