To Florus 5.62
But this can be twisted in the opposite direction: ‘Nature was suited for evil. Since evil could not be voluntary if evil were necessary, the possibility of good was given so that evil could belong to the person as his own.’ This is indeed clever, but insane. Everything is assessed from its better side. Added to this is the dignity of its maker, God: he did not make a free living being for the things he would punish, but gave the possibility of opposites for the things he would reward. Nevertheless, I do not want to fight over this. I allow something to the false objection by declining to settle anything through the maker’s authority. What necessarily follows, however, is that this capacity to do good and evil must be distinguished from the actual result of either will. It is consequently proved to be the necessary cause of neither virtue nor vice.
Even if we insult honorable things by treating their contest with the wicked as grounds to attribute to this capacity neither the merit of a good will nor that of an evil one, it retains the testimony of its freedom: it is innocent because it is full of neither good nor evil—that is, voluntary good or evil. Attribute the possibility of will to nature, then, but attribute neither good nor evil will to nature. The invincible conclusion is that an evil will indeed arose in God’s work, but from possibility, not necessity. This cannot be imputed to the giver of the capacity, but to the one directing that capacity.
Latin
At hoc in contrarium torqueri potest, ut dicatur: Sed malo aptata natura est; nam quia malum voluntarium esse non poterat, si necessitas fuisset mali, ob hoc data est possibilitas boni, ut malo proprietas pararetur. Quod quidem acutum est, sed insanum; omnia enim rerum a meliore parte taxantur: huc et dignitas auctoris accedit, id est, Dei, qui non ob ea quae puniturus erat, liberum animal fecit; sed propter ea qua remuneraturus, possibilitatem contrariorum dedit. Verumtamen super hoc pugnare nolo; sed permitto aliquid calumniae, ut nihil de opificis auctoritate praescribam. Illud tamen necessario sequitur, ut haec possibilitas faciendi boni et mali removeatur ab utriusque voluntatis effectu. Ac per hoc, nec virtutis a necessario probatur causa esse, nec vitii. Ut enim honestis hanc faciamus iniuriam, ut ex eo quo cum improbis certare videantur, nec bonae ei, nec malae adscribatur meritum voluntatis; habet ergo testimonium ingenuitatis suae, quod innocens est, quia nec bono, nec malo, voluntario dumtaxat, plena est. Possibilitatem ergo voluntatis adscribe naturae; voluntatem autem nec bonam, nec malam, naturae. Invicte ergo collectum est, voluntatem malam exortam quidem in opere Dei; sed a possibili, non a necessario; quod reputari non potest possibilitatis datori, sed possibilitatis ipsius gubernatori.
About this text
Julian’s six preserved books to Florus, quoted section by section in Augustine’s unfinished reply. Augustine’s refutations are omitted. Latin of Julian’s words is on each section.
Julian’s own books do not survive as a separate manuscript. English follows his words as Augustine quotes them in the Unfinished Work Against Julian. Augustine’s replies are omitted. We do not restore a Julian text independent of Augustine.
Witnesses
- Copy-text Augustine, Unfinished Work Against Julian (Latin · Julian’s words as quoted, Books 1–6)
- Checked print Augustinus.it Latin of the Unfinished Work (Latin · Same work)
- Checked print Migne PL 45 (Latin · Hard cases)
This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.