To Florus · §5.57

To Florus 5.57

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The good capacity for evil and good therefore does not compel will to arise, but permits it. No one is good merely because he is endowed with free will: many people are equally free yet utterly evil. Nor is anyone evil because he has free will: many equally share this freedom yet are excellent. A human being is thus neither good nor evil because he is free, but could be neither good nor evil unless he were free. This capacity, indicated by the name freedom, was so established by the supremely wise God that without it there cannot be what is not compelled to exist through it. Its single capacity for opposites protects it from predetermination toward either. That is, it cannot be called the cause or necessity of either an evil or a good will, since it receives both without compelling either to exist. Necessary things therefore have a single course and, as it were, one thread: like geometry’s length without breadth. Its unity cannot be divided. As long as it extends singly, it retains the force of its own nature; but where it meets something divided toward different directions, that necessity immediately ends. That is: the good God made the human being good.

Latin source witness

Latin

Bona ergo possibilitas mali atque boni voluntatem non cogit, sed permittit oboriri. Nemo igitur ideo bonus est, quia libero affectus arbitrio est; sunt quippe multi homines aeque liberi, sed tamen pessimi; sed nec ideo quisque malus est, quia liberi arbitrii est; sunt enim multi aeque libertatis huius participes, tamen optimi. Nec bonus igitur, nec malus homo ideo est, quia liber est; sed nec bonus, nec malus esse posset, nisi liber esset. Est ergo ista possibilitas, quae nomine libertatis ostenditur, ita a sapientissimo constituta Deo, ut sine ipsa non sit, quod per ipsam esse non cogitur. Contrariorum enim una capacitate ab utrorumque praeiudicio vindicatur; id est, nec malae voluntatis, nec bonae causa et necessitas dici potest, quae utramque sic recipit, ut neutram compellat existere. Necessariorum ergo singularis ductus, et unum quodam modo filum est, velut geometrica illa sine latitudine longitudo est, nec hic unio dividi potest. Quamdiu ergo singularis extenditur, vim naturae suae tenet; at ubi ei occurrerit quod in diversa findatur, illud necessarium illico terminatur. Id est, bonus Deus bonum fecit hominem.

About this text

Julian’s six preserved books to Florus, quoted section by section in Augustine’s unfinished reply. Augustine’s refutations are omitted. Latin of Julian’s words is on each section.

Julian’s own books do not survive as a separate manuscript. English follows his words as Augustine quotes them in the Unfinished Work Against Julian. Augustine’s replies are omitted. We do not restore a Julian text independent of Augustine.

Witnesses

  • Copy-text Augustine, Unfinished Work Against Julian (Latin · Julian’s words as quoted, Books 1–6)
  • Checked print Augustinus.it Latin of the Unfinished Work (Latin · Same work)
  • Checked print Migne PL 45 (Latin · Hard cases)

This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.