To Florus 3.24
If neither calamity nor weakness nor a desire to transgress bears on him, how can he destroy in judging the pattern of justice he commended by commanding? Indeed, he would be raging not against that justice but against reverence for himself. For fairness has such power that it both condemns those who stray and loses none of its force through the authority of those who abandon it. How, finally, could he want us to do what is just and himself do what is unjust? Does he want us to seem more just than he is—or rather, not more just, but ourselves fair and himself unfair?
Latin
Si ergo nec calamitas nec imbecillitas nec libido ei praevaricationis incumbit, qui fieri potest, ut eam iustitiae formam, quam commendavit iubendo, destruat iudicando, immo non in istam iustitiam, sed in reverentiam suam saeviat (tanta est quippe aequitatis potentia, ut et deviantes arguat et nulla fugientium a se auctoritate minuatur) postremo ut quae sunt iusta a nobis fieri velit et ipse faciat quod iniustum est? Iustiores nos, quam ipse est, cupit videri, immo non iustiores, sed nos aequos et se iniquum?