To Florus 2.233
To avoid seeming to command anything arduous and inaccessible to a human being, he took an expression from ordinary speech and called it ‘human’: that is, easy to handle, something made gentler by comparing the cases. I do not demand of you, he says, an intensity matching these exalted realities; nor, great as virtue’s riches are, do I establish correspondingly novel commands by which you must obtain them. I impose nothing harsh, prescribe nothing barely bearable. If I commanded such a thing in proportion to righteousness’s splendor, you might complain of the flesh’s weakness and plead that you could not bear constant toil. So now I address you with this moderation: apply to virtues the same effort you previously applied to crimes. Although it insults honorable things to pursue them with merely the same determination spent on disgraceful things, it nevertheless suffices for your present training if you pursue righteousness with at least the intensity with which you pursued lawlessness and impurity.
Latin
Ne quid enim arduum et inaccessum homini praecipere videretur, verbum de consuetudine usurpavit, ut humanum diceret, id est facile tractabile, et quod causarum comparatione mitescat. Non a vobis, inquit, reposco parem augustis rebus intentionem nec, quam magnae sunt virtutum opes, tam nova vobis, quibus eas capessatis, praecepta constituo, nihil ferum ingero, nihil quod vix portari possit indico, ne, si pro splendore iustitiae tale aliquid imperarem, de carnis infirmitate conquesti allegaretis iugem vos laborem ferre non posse. Nunc itaque hac moderatione convenio, ut tale studium virtutibus adhibeatis, quale adhibuistis ante criminibus; cumque iniuria sit honestarum rerum, si tali appetantur proposito, quale est deformibus impensum rebus, tamen disciplinae huic, in qua estis, sufficit, si vel tali intentione iustitiam sectemini, quali iniquitatem estis immunditiamque sectati.