Commentary on Ecclesiastes · §36

The Knowledge of Self and the Order of the Soul

He says: 'Behold the handmaid of the Lord; let it be to me according to your word' (Luke 1:38). Thus it shall be to me, as your word flows through me. And I will not say something paradoxical. For 'in the soul' there is also a word: 'the thought which is without being either true or false, when it is already necessary to exist as such,' or to be true or to be false. A thought is called a word because it falls under the definition of knowledge; 'for a word is that which signifies time,' and it is a word in which there is to be a speaking of truth or a speaking of a lie. Since therefore such things are thoughts, we shall call them words.

This is why the divine apostle, knowing this, says 'he has heard unspoken words' (Romans 15:9). And it seems to be a contradiction, unless we take the spoken and the unspoken to mean something different from one another. They are unspoken insofar as they are spoken only in the mind, and God imparts them to the intellect. And they possess truth or falsehood, so that according to this also they are words. They are unspoken because they are not brought forth through syllables, not being able to be written or inscribed. But that which is not brought forth through syllables is unspoken. If, however, each of the things I say is spoken—for I bring it forth through articulated voice—yet the thought, which the voice does not submit, is an unspoken word. For it possesses either the truth or the lie. They are unspoken in that they do not have the quality of being brought forth through syllables and articulated words, but they are words in that they possess truth or falsehood.

And the heart of the wise knows the time of judgment; for in every matter there is a time and a judgment, for much knowledge of the wise is upon it. This is what he says: the mind and the heart of the wise know 'the time of judgment,' not only that which is spoken of in the Scripture. The divine words say 'the time of judgment' regarding that time, by which all stand before the judgment of God. And he calls this time 'the day of judgment.' Here, therefore, the wise man knows all time and the judgment of every matter. Having judged the things, he imposes his judgment, and having judged the words, he brings them forth. For he knows when it is necessary to give an answer and when not, and when to oppose a word and when to let it go for the sake of the listeners. He knows the judgment of this time, so that you might not take a spoken time, such as a day or a night, but a time, to say, such as this.

Having such a state. 'Therefore the heart of the wise man knows the time of judgment,' he knows the judgment, by which it is necessary to use the times. For in every thing there is a time and a judgment. Every thing has a time and a judgment, it is manifest. Therefore, the one able to manage things in this way, as he says timely concerning them and having judged, this one is wise and performs the work of a wise man. For the knowledge of man concerning himself is much.

And human knowledge we receive in two ways, that which he knows and that which is known to him. For example, those who are knowing of themselves possess that same word, of the one knowing and of the one being known. If they are knowing of themselves and not others are knowing of them, they themselves are the knowers and the being known. 'Therefore great is the knowledge of man concerning himself,' and that which he himself knows and that which he himself is known by.

Indeed, countless things have been moved by men toward that opinion which says, 'Know thyself.' It is one, the voice is brief, but the thought is much. He who has known himself has known that he is a created being, and he has known that he has come into being for the acquisition of virtue. He has known that the soul rules in himself and the body is ruled, and again in the soul that the rational part rules, while the desiring and the spirited parts are ruled. If these things happen in reverse, it is bad. That soul, if it is ruled by the body and rules the body, is destruction to that man; and if the rational part is ruled by the spirit or by desire, this rule is lawless.

Therefore it is necessary for the wise man to know himself and to have mastery, that 'the knowledge concerning him is much,' and that which is concerning him, which he ought to know. For if he knows that 'the knowledge concerning him is much'—since he ought to know himself—having known not a little, he will not consider himself to have been perfected in life. Even if he is with all that is possible to exist here and has received knowledge, he knows that 'he knows in part' (1 Cor 13:9) and he will not stop as some already do, but he still works toward acquiring even more knowledge, even if he knows all visible things. And, as Solomon says, you might receive 'knowledge without error' of all 'things that exist,' lifting his mind upon the invisible, he knows that he possesses knowledge in many respects. For he has comprehension of the sensible things alone.

Greek

λέγει· "ἰδοὺ ἡ δούλη κυρίου· γένοιτό μοι κατὰ τὸ ῥῆμά σου." οὕτω ὑπάρξεταί μοι, ὡς τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ σὸν διαγο ρεύει. καὶ οὐ παράδοξον ἐρῶ. καὶ γὰρ "ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ" ἔστιν ῥη῀̣μα· "τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι νόημα, ὁτὲ δὲ ἤδη ᾧ ἀνάγκη υ῾̣πάρχειν θάτε ρον," ἢ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. ἰδὲ νόημα ῥῆμα καλεῖται, ἐπεὶ ὑποπίπ τει τῷ ὁρισμῷ αὐτοῦ γνώσεως· "ῥῆμα γάρ ἐστιν τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον", καὶ ῥῆμά ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν ἀληθεῦσαι ἢ 36 ψεύσασθαι. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ νοήματά εἰσιν τοιαῦτα, ῥήματα αὐτὰ ἐροῦμεν. 237 τοῦτο οὖν ὁ θεῖος ἀπόστολος ἐπιστάμενος λέγει "ἀκηκοέναι ἄρρητα ῥήματα." καὶ δοκεῖ ἀντίφασις εἶναι, εἰ μὴ κατὰ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο σημαινό μενον λάβωμεν τὸ ῥητὸν καὶ ἄρρητον. ἄρρητά ἐστιν, παρ' ὅσον ἐν νῷ μόνῳ ὁμι λοῦνται καὶ θεὸς ἐνίησιν αὐτὰ τῇ διανοίᾳ. καὶ ἔχουσιν τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεύδεσθαι, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτό εἰσι̣ν καὶ ῥήματα. ἄρρητά εἰσιν οὐ λεγό μενα διὰ συλλαβῶν, οὐχ οἷά τε ὄντα γραφῆναι καὶ χαραχθῆναι. τῷ δὲ μὴ προφέρεσθαι διὰ συλλαβῶν ἄρρητά ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον, ὧν λέγω, ῥητόν ἐστιν–προφέρομαι γὰρ αὐτὸ διὰ ἐνάρθρου φωνῆς–, τὸ μέντοι νόημα, ὃ οὐχ ὑποβάλλει ἡ φωνή, ἄρρητον ῥῆμά ἐστιν. ἔχει γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ ψεῦδος. ἄρρητά εἰσιν παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν διὰ συλλαβῶν καὶ λέξεων ἐνάρθρων προφέρεσ̣θαι, τῷ δὲ ἔχειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ῥήματά εἰσιν. καὶ καιρὸν κρίσεως γιγνώσκειν καρδία σοφοῦ· ὅτι παντὶ πράγματι ἔστιν καιρὸς καὶ κρίσις, ὅτι γνῶσις τοῦ σο φοῦ πολλὴ ἐπ' αὐτόν. τοῦτο λέγει· ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ καρδία τοῦ σοφοῦ οἶδεν "τὸν τῆς κρίσεως καιρόν", οὐ μόνον τὸν κατωμιλημένον ἐν τῇ γραφῇ. "καιρὸν κρίσεως" λέγουσιν οἱ θεῖοι λόγοι τὸν καιρὸν ἐκεῖνον, καθ' ὃν πάντες τῷ κριτη ρίῳ τοῦ θεοῦ παρίστανται. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν καλεῖ "ἡμέραν κρίσεως." ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὁ σοφὸς πάντα καιρὸν καὶ κρίσιν παντὸς πράγματος οἶδεν. κε κριμένως τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλλει, τοὺς λόγους κεκριμένως πρ̣οφέρει. οἶδεν γάρ, πότε δεῖ δοῦναι ἀπόκρισιν καὶ πότε οὔ, καὶ πότε ἀντισχεῖν τ̣ο`̣ν λόγον καὶ πότε ἐξαφεῖναι αὐτὸν̣ κατὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν. τὴν κρίσιν οὖν τούτου τοῦ καιροῦ ἐπίσταται, ἵνα καιρὸν μὴ χρόνον λάβῃς τινὰ ῥητόν, οἷον ἡμερινὸν ἢ νυκτερινόν, ἀλλὰ καιρὸν τῷ εἰπεῖν τοιάδε τινὰ τῷ τοιάν δε ἕξιν ἔχοντι. "ἡ καρδία οὖν τοῦ σοφοῦ οἶδεν τὸν καιρὸν τῆς κρίσεως", οἶδεν τὴν κρίσιν, καθ' ἣν̣ δ̣εῖ τ̣ο̣ῖς καιροῖς χρήσασθαι. ὅτι παντὶ πράγματι ἔστιν καιρὸς καὶ κρίσις. πᾶν πρᾶγμα ἔχει καιρὸν καὶ κρίσιν δηλονότι. ὁ δυνάμενος οὖν τὰ πράγματα οὕτω με̣ταχειρίζεσθαι, ὡς καιρίως λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ κεκρι μένως, οὗτος σοφός ἐστιν καὶ σοφοῦ ἔργον ποιεῖ. ὅτι γνῶσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλὴ ἐπ' αὐτόν. 238 γνῶσιν δὲ ἀνθρώπου δίττως λαμβάνομεν, ἢ ἣν γιγνώσκει ἢ ἣν γιγνώσκε ται. οἷον οἱ ἑαυτῶν ἐπιγνώμονες σοφοὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἔχουσιν, τοῦ τε γιγνώσκοντος καὶ τοῦ γιγνωσκομένου. εἰ ἑαυτῶν ἐπιγνώμονές εἰσιν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοι αὐτοὺς ἐπιγιγνώσκουσιν, αὐτοί εἰσιν οἱ γιγνώσκοντες καὶ οἱ γιγ νωσκόμενοι. "πολλὴ οὖν ἐστιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἡ γνῶσις ἡ ἐπ' αὐτόν", καὶ ἣν αὐτὸς γιγνώσκει καὶ ἣν αὐτὸς γιγνώσκεται. ἀμέλει γοῦν μύρια ὅσα κεκινήκασιν ἄνθρωποι εἰς τὴν γνώμην ἐκείνην τὴν λέγουσαν "σεαυτὸν γνῶθι". μία ἐστίν, βραχεῖά ἐστιν ἡ φωνή, πολλὴ δέ ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια. ὁ γνοὺς ε῾̣αυτὸν οἶδεν, ὅτι γενητός ἐστιν, καὶ οἶδεν, ὅτι πέφυκεν πρὸς ἀνάλημψιν ἀρετῆς. οἶδεν, ὅτι ἄρχει ἐν αὑτῷ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἄρχεται τὸ σῶμα, καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὅτι ἄρχει μὲν τὸ λογιςτικόν, ἄρ χεται δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικόν. ἐὰν ἔνπαλιν ταῦτα γίνεται, κάκι στόν ἐστιν. ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη ἐὰν ἄρχηται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἄρχῃ τὸ σῶμα, ὄλεθρος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐκείνῳ· καὶ ἐὰν τὸ λογιστικὸν ἄρχηται ὑπὸ θυμοῦ ἢ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας, ἡ ἀρχὴ αὕτη παράνομός ἐστιν. δεῖ οὖν τὸν σοφὸν εἰδέναι ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ὅτι "ἡ ἐπ' αὐτῷ γνῶσις πολλή ἐστιν", καὶ ἡ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἣν γιγνώσκειν ὀφείλει. ἐὰν γὰρ γνῷ, ὅτι "πολλή ἐστιν ἡ ἐπ' αὐτὸν γνῶσις"– ε᾿̣π̣ε̣ι`̣ δε̣ι῀̣ α̣υ῾̣τ̣ο`̣ν̣ γιγνώσκειν–, οὐκ ὀλίγα γνοὺς πεπαύσεται νομί ζων τετελειῶσθαι. κἂν πᾶσαν ο̣ὐ῀̣ν τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐνταῦθα ὑπαρχθῆναι σύν εσιν καὶ γνῶσιν λάβῃ, οἶδεν ὅτι "ἐκ μέρους γιγνώσκει" καὶ οὐ παύσε τα̣ι̣ ὥς τινες ἤδη, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ἄλλην γνῶσιν, κἂν γνῷ πάντα τὰ ὁρατά. καὶ, ὡς Σολομὼν λέγει, πάντων "τῶν ὄντων" λάβῃς "γνῶσιν ἀψευδῆ", ἀναφέρων τὸν νοῦν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀόρατα οἶδεν, ὅτι ἐν πολλοῖς ἔχει γνῶσιν. αἰσθητῶν γὰρ μόνων ἔχει ἀντίλημψιν.

About this text

Didymus the Blind on Ecclesiastes.

Original English Translation — new OET from PG Greek.

Catalogue & scope

Khazarzar scan

Witnesses

  • Copy-text PG (Khazarzar) (Greek)

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