The Purpose of Creation and the Knowledge of God's Works
That the Lord has tested them. And again: 'silver given with deceit is to be regarded as an earthenware vessel.' If this is a clever deceit, it is not like one who has been 'cleansed sevenfold' or regarded as such, nor is it established by itself, like one who has the word of one who has been refined. For those who present a word that is earthly and have an earthly nature do not speak concerning wisdom. First, they have received an earthly nature.
For human wisdom is in a shadow and upon the earth. He says that its shadow is in wisdom, as the wisdom of silver, in which the wisdom is in its own shadow. If, therefore, he praises the being of wisdom, and its shadow is the best. What then is 'in the shadow of wisdom'? He who speaks while in the shadow of the Gospel is in the original Gospel, or he who is in the shadow of the Law. And the abundance of knowledge of wisdom will vivify the one who is from it. And this is good, to always enjoy in the progress of the contemplation of wisdom. 'He will vivify the one who is from it.' For this reason it is to be preferred and is good, because it makes the one participating in it alive—'the one who is from it,' he says, the one who is wise according to it—for the wisdom of life is not to be set aside. It never brings death to the soul.
Behold the works of God: for who will be able to turn away whom God turns? Many also among the Greeks have opposed those saying that the cosmos consists of things from themselves, such as Epicurus, and according to some, Democritus. For they think that this cosmos did not come from God, because they do not posit providence. Since every necessity is that the one being provided for should provide for his own works, and God is the one providing, He provides for the cosmos which He Himself made. Give the rest: that which He Himself constructed, this also He protects by providence, so that it may stand. Some therefore argue: 'If the cosmos was made best, what is the use of the basilisk existing? If the usefulness of being is entirely given, it is necessary for the basilisk and the others, such as the rhinoceros, to exist.' And it is more pleasing to the Epicurean to make mockery than praise. Because of these things, he generally rejects providence. But those who oppose the...
They believe this godless dogma. Who would say to the world that a part of the world needs straightening? How else could it have happened? How could it have been driven? How could a world be without parts? If these things, what are the parts? For neither are they shown to be passing by or in excess, if the world is able to consist out of them.
But we say that it is possible to persuade by a probable demonstration, both the cause and that the wild things were created for uses. And these things contribute to hunting. By a first common and right reason, it is possible to say that all things are for humans. Many of these things contribute to the help of them and gap receiving gap and intending gap receiving gap. From this, it is possible for a generation to be made manifest according to which they came to be, so that we might use only these, so that we might not torture any remaining or other higher discourse, because for the sake of humans even these things have come to be.
Therefore God knows the causes of the things having happened, and He knows why He hid them. According to all this He says only: 'Do not say: For what purpose is this? Or for what purpose is this? For all things shall be sought in their time' (Eccl 3:10-11). And: 'Do not say: For what purpose is this? Or for what purpose is this? For all things were created for their use' (Eccl 1:28).
Behold the works of God. Understand the works of God—for this 'behold' says it—understand also their existence and the reason according to which they are, and, if it is what it is, and the cause. 'For who will be able to arrange the world?' Many things contribute to perfect knowledge, and it is not possible for all things to exist for all people; for example, to say, I say, to be God or to be a world. It is sufficient for me regarding the 'that it is' to know only, and what the name placed against it means. But the 'how' is not for everyone to know, but not even for the one knowing everything is it possible to say the 'how'. It is possible to know by which word and knowledge. For indeed the gap observing gap and gap the one knowing gap through what it is, and that it is, and how it is. And in these, not everyone knowing that it is, knows also how it is and why. 'Behold' therefore 'the works of God', understand them, know what each of them is and that it is.
Greek
ὅτι ἀπεδοκίμασεν αὐτοὺς κύριος". καὶ πάλιν· "ἀργύρι ον μετὰ δόλου διδόμενον ὡ´̣σπερ ὄστρακον ἡγη̣τέον". ἐὰν τοῦτο, σοφὸν δό λον προφέρει, οὐχ οὕτως "καθαρισθὲν ἑπταπλασίως" ἔχων ἢ ἡγιασμένον, οὐ κατ' αυ᾿̣τ̣ὸ πεποιωμένος, ὡς ὁ πεπυρ̣ωμένον ἔχων τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον̣. οὑ῀̣ το̣ς γὰρ οὐ λόγον γεώδη καὶ ἐκ τῆς γ̣ῆς ἔχοντα τ̣ὴν φυ´̣σιν προ̣φέρει περὶ σοφι´̣ας ······ υνοθ·····χ̣ο̣μενη. πρῶτον μὲν γεώδη φ̣ύσ̣ιν μ̣ε̣τέ λαβεν. ἐν σκιᾷ γάρ ε᾿̣στιν ἡ σοφία ἡ ἀν̣θρωπίνη καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς̣ ····· ····· ···η ἐστιν τοῦ ············ λέγει ὅτι ἡ σκιὰ αὐτῆς ἐν σοφία, ὡς σοφία του῀̣ α᾿̣ρ̣γ̣υ̣ρ̣ι´̣ου, ὁ´̣τ̣ι ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς σκιᾷ ἡ σοφία. ἐὰν οὖν ἐπαινε τὴ ᾖν ἡ σοφία, καὶ ἡ σκιὰ αὐτῆς βέλτιστός ἐστιν. ἐπερ· τὸ οὖν "ἐν σκιᾷ σοφίας"; ὁ λέγων δὲ ἐν τῇ σκιᾷ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ὢν ἐν αὐτῷ πρωτοτύπῳ εὐαγγελίῳ ἐστὶν ἢ ὁ ἐν τῇ σκιᾷ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ περισσεία γνώσεως τῆς σοφίας ζῳοποιήσει τὸν παρ' αὐτῆς. καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν ἐστ̣ιν τὸ ἀεὶ ἀπολαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς προκοπαῖς θεω ρίας τῆς σοφίας. "ζῳοποιήσει τὸν παρ' αὐτῆς". διὰ τοῦτο προκριτέα ἐστὶν καὶ ἀγαθή, ὅτι τὸν μετέχοντα αὐτῆς ζῶντα ποιεῖ–"τὸν παρ' αὐ τῆς", τὸν κατ' αὐτὴν σοφὸν λέγει–ἡ γὰρ σοφία ζωῆς παραιτία ἐστίν. οὐ δέποτε θάνατον ψυχῇ ἐπιφέρει. ἰδὲ τὰ ποιήματα τοῦ θεοῦ· ὅτι τίς δυνήσεται τοῦ κοσμῆ σαι, ὃν ἂν ὁ θεὸς διαστρέψῃ αὐτόν; πολλοὶ καὶ παρ' Ἕλλησιν ἀντέστησαν τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συνεστηκότα τὸν κόσμον λέγουσιν, οἷός ἐστιν Ἐπίκουρος, κατά τινας καὶ ∆ημόκριτος. 210 ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οἴο̣νται μὴ ἐκ θεοῦ τοῦτον το`̣ν κόσμον γεγονέναι, ἐπεὶ μὴ τίθενται πρόνοιαν. ἐπεὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὸν προνοούμενον τῶν ἰδίων π̣οιημάτων προνο εῖσθαι, ὁ δὲ θεός ἐστιν ο῾̣ προνοούμενος, προνοε̣ῖται τοῦ κόσμου̣, ὃν ἐποίησεν αὐτός. δίδου τὰ ἄλλα· ὃν αὐτὸς̣ κατεσκεύασεν, το̣ῦτον καὶ φυ λάττει ἐκ̣ π̣ρονοίας, ἵν' ὄρθωσι̣ν ἔχ̣ῃ. ἐνκαλοῦσιν ο̣ὖν τινες ὅτι· "ε̣ι᾿̣ ἄριστος ἐποιήθη ὁ κόσμος, τί τὸ χρήσι μον τοῦ εἶναι βασιλίσκους; ἐάν̣ γε ὅλως δοθῇ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι, δεῖ καὶ τὸν βασιλίσκον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οἷον ο῾̣ ῥινοκ̣έρως". κ̣α̣ὶ μᾶλλον ψόγον γ̣ι´̣ν̣ε σθαι ἀρέσκει τῷ ἐπικουρίζ̣οντι ἢ ἔπαινον. τούτων ἕνεκα καθόλου δὴ αἴ ρει τὴν πρόνοιαν. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ ἀντιλέγον̣τες τοῖς τοῦτο τὸ ἄθεον δόγμα̣ π̣ι̣στεύουσιν. τίς ἂν πρὸς τὸν κόσμον εἶπεν̣ ὁ´̣τι μ̣έρος τοῦ κόςμου ὀρ θώσεως δεῖται; πῶς ἂν ἄλλως ἦν γεγονὸς α̣υ᾿̣τ̣ο´̣; πῶς ἂν αὐτὸ ἠ´̣νυσ̣εν; πῶς ἂν ἐδύνατο κόσμος εἶναι ἄνευ μερῶν; ἐὰν τάδε, τίνα τὰ μέρη; οὐδὲ γὰρ δείκνυνται παρέλκοντα καὶ περισσά, ἐὰν ἐξ αὐτῶν συνστῆναι ὁ κόσμο̣ς δύνηται. λε´̣γομεν δὲ πιθανῇ ἀποδείξει πεῖσ̣αι μὲν δυναμένην αἰτίαν καὶ τὰ ἄγρια δ̣ε̣δημιουργῆσθαι̣ εἰς χρείας̣. κ̣αὶ πρὸς θήρευσιν συντελεῖ ταῦτα. ἐπὶ πρώτῳ κοινῷ ὀρθ̣ῷ λόγῳ δ̣υνατὸν λέγειν τ̣ὰ π̣άντα εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. πολλὰ ἐκ τούτ̣ων συντελεῖ πρ̣ὸς βοήθειαν ἐκ̣είνων καὶ ε̣····· ····· ··ν παραλαμβανόντω̣ν ······· καὶ μέλ̣λ̣ε̣ι̣ν̣ ·· πολ···· παραλαβει῀̣ν. ἐκ τούτου̣ δ̣υ´̣ν̣α̣τ̣αι̣ γ̣ε´̣ν̣ε̣σ̣ι̣ς̣ δηλοῦσθαι καθ' ἣν γέγοναν, ἵνα μόνοις 22 αὐτ̣ο̣ι῀̣ς̣ χρώμεθα, ἵνα μὴ λοιπὸν καὶ ἄλλον τινὰ ὑψηλότερον λόγον βασανίσωμεν, ὅτι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτα γεγένηται. οἶδεν οὖν ὁ θεὸς τὰς αἰτίας τῶν γεγενημένων καὶ οἶδεν διὰ τί ἀπέκρυψεν αὐτά. καθ όλου τοῦτο μόνον λέγει· "μὴ εἴπῃς· εἰς τί τοῦτο; ἢ εἰς τί τοῦτο; πάντα γὰρ ἐν καιρῷ αὐτῶν ζητηθήσεται". καὶ· "μὴ εἴπῃς· εἰς τί τοῦτο; ἢ εἰς τί τοῦτο; πάντα γὰρ εἰς χρείαν αὐτῶν ἐκτίσθη". ἰδὲ τὰ ποιήματα τοῦ θεοῦ. ἐπίστησον τοῖς ποιήμασιν τοῦ θεοῦ–τὸ "ἰδὲ" γὰρ τοῦτο λέγει–, ἐπίστησον καὶ τῇ ὑπάρξει αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅν εἰσιν, καί, εἰ οἷ όν τέ ἐστιν, καὶ τῇν αἰτίᾳν. "ὅτι τίς δυνήσεται τοῦ ἐπικοσμῆσαι". πολλά ἐστιν τὰ συντελοῦντα πρὸς τελείαν γνῶσιν, καὶ οὐ πάντα πᾶσιν δύ ναται ὑπάρχειν· οἷον φέρε εἰπεῖν, λέγω εἶναι θεὸν ἢ εἶναι κόσμον. ἀπαρ κεῖ μοι πρὸς τῷ "ὅτι ἔστιν" γνῶναι μόνον καὶ τί σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα τὸ κείμενον κατ' αὐτοῦ. τὸ "πῶς" δέ ἐστιν οὐ παντὸς εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὐ 211 δὲ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπισταμένου τὸ "πῶς̣" ε᾿̣στιν δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν. τ̣ὸ δ̣υ´̣ν̣αται ᾧ λ̣όγος καὶ γνῶσις ἐστιν. κ̣αὶ γ̣α`̣ρ̣ τὸν γ̣··ων θεωρουμένων ·η̣· κ̣α̣ι`̣ ε̣····δ̣·····ν ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς̣ δι̣α`̣ τ̣ι´̣ ἐστιν̣ καὶ ὅτι ἐστιν καὶ πῶς ἐστιν. καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ πᾶς ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι ἔστιν οἶδεν καὶ πῶς ε᾿̣στιν καὶ διὰ τί. "ἰδὲ" οὖν "τ̣α`̣ πο̣ιη´̣ματα τοῦ θεοῦ", ἐπίστησον αὐτοῖς, γνῶθι τί ἕκα̣στο̣ν αὐτῶν ἐστιν καὶ ὅτι ἐ´̣σ̣τ̣ι̣ν̣
About this text
Didymus the Blind on Ecclesiastes.
Catalogue & scope
Khazarzar scan
Witnesses
- Copy-text PG (Khazarzar) (Greek)
This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Greek on each section for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.