How knowing, believing, and opining differ from one another
Article II. How knowing, believing, and opining differ from one another.
1. Every assent of the mind is an act of knowing, of believing, or of opining. Whenever we judge something true, either we certainly know it, or we believe it because of another's testimony, or we opine it because of a light and inefficacious reason.
2. The act of knowing, opposed to believing and opining, is taken broadly for any actual certain and evident knowledge. Science so taken appears not only in speculative disciplines but in practical ones. In moral philosophy we do not opine or believe but evidently know that acts of liberality are honorable and the opposed vices dishonorable. Skilled architects do not opine or believe but evidently know that foundations must be set to the level and columns to the perpendicular. This knowledge concerns singulars as well as universals: when I see Peter standing or hear him speaking, I do not opine or believe — I know that he speaks and stands.
3. The division is sufficient: every assent rests either on testimony or on reason. If on testimony, it is actual faith — an act of believing. If on reason, either on certain and solid reason (science) or on merely probable reason (opinion).
4. Assent on another's testimony is either divine faith (on divine testimony) or human faith (on human testimony), as the Scholastics speak.
5. Note the Papists' error in passing. They grant with us that faith resting chiefly on men's testimony is human, not divine; yet they boldly claim that our assent to the articles of faith and to Scripture itself rests on the testimony of the "representative" Church — bishops and pastors in general council — and of the "virtual" Church, the Roman Pontiff. They must either confess that all wayfarers' faith is human (divine faith abolished) or call their bishops not men but gods.
6. Compare science, opinion, and divine faith. Science is firm, certain, and evident assent. Divine faith is firm and certain, but not evident. Opinion is sometimes firm (without hesitation), yet often neither firm nor certain nor evident.
7. Science is firm because the knower assents without doubt or hesitation; certain because he rests on a solid foundation — else he would opine, not know; evident because he assents not because another testifies, but because by some evident argument he himself perceives that the matter so holds.
8. Divine faith is firm because believers in God do not hesitate about sacred history and the divine promises; certain because it rests on God's testimony, who is truth itself; yet not evident — for the believer assents not because sense or reason shows him that the matter so holds, but because God testifies and asserts it.
9. So the Apostle in Hebrews 11:1 excellently expressed divine faith's nature: calling it hypostasis he marks its firmness and certainty; calling it the evidence of things not seen he declares its inevidence and enigmatic obscurity.
10. Opinion can sometimes be firm — people take light reasons for strongest arguments and assent without fear of the opposite — but it is never certain or evident. The one who opines rests on light reasons or men's testimonies, which never yield certainty or evidence of judging.
11. Does this comparison derogate from faith's dignity, since any science would then be a more perfect assent than faith for want of evidence? Answer: science is more perfect than faith in a respect, because it is evident assent; but faith is more perfect than any science simply and absolutely — for two reasons. First, faith concerns the noblest object: that great mystery of godliness — God revealed in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen by angels, preached to the nations. Second, faith rests on the most certain foundation: God's own testimony, who is truth itself and can neither deceive nor be deceived.
Latin
ART. II. Quomodo inter se differant, scire, credere & opinari. 1. Omnis assensus mentis vel est actus sciendi, vel actus credendi, vel actus opinandi; quandocunque enim judicamus aliquid esse verum, vel certe scimus illud esse verum, vel credimus illud esse verum propter alterius testimonium; vel propter levem et inefficacem rationem opinamur illud esse verum. 2. Actus sciendi, cum opponitur actibus credendi & opinandi, late accipitur, pro quavis notitia actuali certa & evidente; quomodo accepta scientia non solum cernitur in disciplinis speculativis, sed etiam in practicis; nam in Philosophia morali, quae est disciplina practica, non opinamur, aut credimus, sed evidenter scimus actiones liberalitatis esse honestas, actiones vero vitiorum ei oppositorum esse inhonestas; in aedificatoria arte non opinantur aut credunt, sed evidenter sciunt periti Architecti bases in aedificiis esse ad libellam collocandas, columnas esse ad perpendiculum erigendas, aliaque similia: nec solum circa universalia, sed etiam singularia versatur haec notitia. Nam cum video Petrum stantem, aut audio Petrum loquentem, non opinor, aut credo, sed scio Petrum loqui & stare. 3. Hujus divisionis sufficientia sic demonstratur: omnis assensus mentis vel nititur testimonio, vel ratione: si nititur testimonio, est fides actualis, seu actus credendi; si vero nititur ratione, vel nititur ratione certa & solida, estque scientia; vel nititur ratione tantum probabili, estque opinio. 4. Assensus nitens alterius testimonio, vel nititur testimonio divino, & a Scholasticis appellatur fides divina; vel nititur testimonio humano, & appellatur fides humana. 5. Hic obiter notare possumus Pontificiorum errorem; qui nobiscum fatentur, eam fidem non divinam sed humanam esse, quae praecipue testimonio hominum nititur; & nihilominus audacissime asseverant, assensum, quem praebemus articulis fidei & ipsi sacrae Scripturae, unde illi articuli colliguntur, niti testimonio Ecclesiae (ut vocant) representativae, h. e. Episcoporum & Pastorum in generali concilio congregatorum; item Ecclesiae (ut ipsi loquuntur) virtualis, h. e. ipsius Pontificis Romani: atque ita aut fateri cogentur, omnem fidem viatorum humanam esse, penitus videlicet sublata fide divina, aut eorum Episcopos non homines sed DEOS indigitandos esse. 6. Pulchra institui potest comparatio inter scientiam, opinionem, & fidem divinam: scientia enim est assensus firmus, certus, & evidens; fides divina est assensus firmus & certus, sed non evidens; opinio denique etsi aliquando sit assensus firmus, h. e. sine haesitatione aut dubitatione, saepe tamen neque est firmus, neque certus, neque evidens. 7. Scientia est assensus firmus; quia is qui scit propositionem aliquam esse veram, non dubitanter aut haesitanter assentitur, sed firmiter: est assensus certus, quia is qui scit, nititur solido aliquo fundamento; alioqui non sciret, sed opinaretur: denique est evidens, quia sciens non ideo assentitur, quod alius testetur eam propositionem esse veram, sed quod ipse vi alicujus evidentis argumenti, percipiat rem ita se habere. 8. Fides divina est assensus firmus, quia illi qui in DEUM credunt, non haesitant, aut dubitant de veritate historiae sacrae, & promissionum divinarum: est assensus certus, quia nititur certissimo fundamento, videlicet DEI testimonio, qui est ipsa veritas: non tamen est evidens; is enim qui credit, non ideo assentitur, quod sensu aut ratione percipiat rem ita se habere, sed quod DEUS hoc testetur & asserat. 9. Hinc patet, quam egregie Apostolus, undecimo ad Hebraeos, versu primo, naturam fidei divinae expresserit; cum enim dicit eam esse hypostasin, indicat ejus firmitatem & certitudinem; cum vero dicit eam esse elenchon pragmaton ou blepomenon, ejus inevidentiam & obscuritatem enigmaticam declarat. 10. Opinio aliquando potest esse assensus firmus, (nonnunquam enim homines ita moventur levibus rationibus, ut eas pro validissimis argumentis habeant, ideoque absque ulla haesitatione aut formidine partis oppositae assentiuntur;) nunquam vero est certus aut evidens: is enim qui opinatur, vel nititur levibus rationibus, vel hominum testimoniis, quae nunquam pariunt nobis aut certitudinem aut evidentiam judicandi. 11. Dicet aliquis, hanc comparationem fidei, scientiae, & opinionis, quam jam attulimus, derogare de dignitate fidei; ex ea enim sequitur, quamlibet scientiam esse perfectiorem assensum fide, quia viz. deest fidei evidentia, quae tamen competit scientiae. Respond. Scientiam esse perfectiorem fide secundum quid, quia viz. est assensus evidens; fidem vero esse perfectiorem qualibet scientia simpliciter & absolute; idque propter duas rationes. 1. enim fides versatur circa nobilissimum objectum, h. e. circa magnum illud mysterium pietatis, DEUM in carne revelatum, justificatum in spiritu, conspectum ab Angelis, & praedicatum Gentibus. 2. Fides nititur certissimo fundamento, h. e. DEI ipsius testimonio, qui ipsa veritas est, quique nec fallere nec falli potest.
About this text
Robert Baron, Philosophia Theologiae Ancillans (Philosophy in Service to Theology): the first exercise, on being and essence, and the second, on the origin of the soul and the spread of sin — newly rendered from Latin. Later exercises are not in this volume.
English follows locked 1658 Oxford Latin. Prima Art. I-XII from IA PDF leaves ~15-53. Secunda Art. I-XV from PDF leaves 56-107 / printed pp.54-105 (tess+pdftotext+DjVu). No modern English copied. Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.
Catalogue & scope
Wing B887. IA bim_early-english-books-1641-1700_philosophia-theologi-an_baron-robert_1658. Exercitatio Prima Art. I-XII; Exercitatio Secunda Art. I-XV (De origine animae & propagatione peccati). Not whole Philosophia (213 pp). Exercitatio Tertia+ remain.
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