Tertullian — On Repentance 3
III. [1] For whom, then, repentance seems just and owed — that is, what things are to be counted as sin — the place indeed demands that we mark them, but it can seem idle. [2] For when the Lord is known, the spirit of its own, looking back to its author, rises to the knowledge of truth and, admitted to the Lord’s precepts, is at once taught from them that that is to be counted as sin from which God bars us: since, when God stands as something great of good, assuredly nothing but evil would displease the good, because between contraries there is no friendship. [3] Still it will not irk to note that certain delicts are carnal, that is bodily, and certain truly spiritual — for since man is made from this gathering of a double substance, he does not offend from elsewhere than from what he consists of — [4] but they do not differ among themselves because body and spirit are two; rather they are more equal because the two make one, lest anyone, for the diversity of materials, distinguish their sins so as to think one lighter or heavier than the other. [5] Since both flesh and spirit are God’s things — one shaped by his hand, the other finished by his breath — when therefore they belong equally to the Lord, whichever of them offends equally offends the Lord. [6] Or do you distinguish the acts of flesh and spirit, which both in life and in death and in resurrection have so much communion and partnership that they are raised together then either into life or into judgment, because clearly they either offended together or acted innocently together? [7] We have put this first so that we understand no less necessity of repentance hangs over one part than over both, if either has offended; the guilt of both is common, and the judge is common — God, of course — therefore the medicine of repentance is also common. [8] Thereafter they are named spiritual and bodily, because every delict is either done or thought, so that what is in deed is bodily because a deed, like a body, can be seen and touched, but what is in the mind is spiritual because, like spirit, it is neither seen nor held. [9] By which it is shown that delicts not of deed only but also of will are to be avoided and purged by repentance.
Latin
III. [1] Quorum ergo paenitentia iusta et debita videatur, id est quae delicto deputanda sint, locus quidem expostulat denotare, sed otiosum videri potest. [2] Domino enim cognito ultro spiritus a suo auctore respectus emergit ad notitiam veritatis et admissus ad dominica praecepta ex ipsis statim eruditur id peccato deputandum, a quo deus arceat: quoniam, cum deum grande quid boni constet esse, utique bono nisi malum non displiceret, quod inter contraria sibi nulla ami- citia est. [3] Praestringere tamen non pigebit delictorum quaedam esse carnalia, id est corporalia, quaedam vero spiritalia - nam cum ex hac duplicis substantiae eongregatione confectus homo sit, non aliunde delinquit quam unde constat -; [4] sed non eo inter se differunt, quod corpus et spiritus duo sunt, atquin eo magis paria sunt, quia duo unum efficiunt, ne quis pro diversitate materiarum peccata earum discernat ut alterum altero levius aut gravius existimet. [5] Siquidem et caro et spiritus dei res, alia manu eius expressa, alia adflatu [eius] consummata; cum ergo ex pari ad dominum pertineant, quodcumque eorum deliquerit ex pari dominum offendit. [6] An tu discernas actus carnis et spiritus, quorum et in vita et in morte et in resurrectione tantum communionis atque consortii est, ut pariter tunc aut in vitam aut in iudicium suscitentur, quia scilicet pariter aut deliquerint aut innocenter egerint? [7] Hoc eo praemisimus ut non minorem alteri quam utrique parti, si quid deliquerit, paenitentiae necessitatem intellegamus inpendere; communis reatus amborum est, communis et iudex, deus scilicet: communis igitur et paenitentiae medella. [8] Exinde spiritalia et corporalia nominantur, quod delictum omne aut agitur aut cogitatur, ut corporale sit quod in facto est quia factum ut corpus et videri et contingi habet, spiritale vero quod in animo est quia ut spiritus neque videtur neque tenetur. [9] Per quod ostenditur non facti solum, verum et voluntatis delicta vitanda et paenitentia purganda esse. Neque enim, si mediocritas humana facti solummodo iudicat quia voluntatis latebris par non est, idcirco [etiam] crimina eius etiam sub deo neglegamus. [10] Deus in omnia sufficit; nihil a conspectu eius remotum unde omnino delinquitur; quia non ignorat, nec omittit quominus in iudicium decernat: dissimulator et praevaricator perspicaciae suae non est! [11] Quid quod voluntas facti origo est? Viderint enim, si qua casui aut necessitati aut ignorantiae inputantur, quibus exceptis iam non nisi voluntate delinquitur. [12] Cum ergo facti origo sit, non tanto potior ad poenam est quanto principalis ad culpam? Qua ne tunc quidem liberatur cum aliqua difficultas perpetrationem eius intercipit: ipsa enim sibi inputatur nec excusari poterit per illam perficiendi infelicitatem, operata quod suum fuerat. [13] Denique dominus quemadmodum se adiectionem legi superstruere demonstrat nisi et voluntatis interdicendo delicta? Cum adulterum non eum solum definit qui comminus in alienum matrimonium cecidisset, verum etiam illum qui adspectus concupiscentia contaminasset. [14] Adeo quod prohibetur administrare, satis periculose animus sibi repraesentat et temere per voluntatem expungit effectum. Cuius voluntatis cum vis tanta sit ut nos solatio sui saturans pro facto cedat, pro facto ergo plectetur. [15] Vanissimum est dicere: 'volui nec tamen feci'; atquin perficere debes quia vis, aut nec velle quia nec perficis. [16] Sed ipse conscientiae tuae confessionem pronuntias, nam si bonum concupisceres, perficere gestisses; porro si ut malum non perficis, nec concupiscere debueras: quaqua te constitueris, crimini adstringeris qua aut malum volueris aut bonum non adinpleveris!