Tertullian, On the Resurrection of the Flesh 14
Let us turn now from those outlines of divine power—whether God was acting or speaking—to His own decrees and ordinances, the very framework by which we structure this whole division of the subject. We began with the flesh's standing: whether it is the thing to which the salvation of the fallen is owed. Then we pressed on to the power of God: whether it is great enough to be the habitual source of salvation for what has fallen. Now, if we have established both points, I want you to investigate the cause as well—whether there is some cause so worthy that it vindicates the flesh's necessary resurrection and proves it categorically owed to reason. We must say this, because even if the flesh is capable of being restored, and even if the divinity is fit to restore it, the cause of restoration still has to come first.
So take hold of the cause too, as you learn it from God—a cause as good as it is just: good on His part, just on ours. If man had not sinned, he would have known God as good alone, by nature's own property; but now he also experiences God as just, forced by the cause's necessity. Yet even this makes Him good, while He is just. For by helping the good and punishing the evil, He displays justice, and He delivers both verdicts for the good: on the one hand vindicating the one, on the other rewarding the other. But you will learn more fully with Marcion whether this is the whole of God. Meanwhile ours is such: deservedly Judge, because Lord; deservedly Lord, because Author; deservedly Author, because God. From this it follows that a certain heretic is not deservedly Judge, since he is not God; not deservedly Lord, since he is not Author—I do not even know if he is God now, since he is neither Author as God nor Lord as Author.
Therefore, if it is most fitting for God and Lord and Author to destine judgment for man, then the resurrection will infallibly bring that judgment forth from this very fact—whether the man took care to recognize and observe his Lord and Author, or not. This will be the entire cause, or rather the necessity, of the resurrection: a destining of judgment most fitting to God. From His disposition you may consider whether the divine scrutiny presides over both substances of the human being to be judged—both soul and flesh. For what is fitting to be judged is also competent to be resurrected.
We affirm that the full and perfect judgment of God must be believed as now ultimate and thenceforth perpetual: so that it is also just, because it falls short in nothing; so that it is also worthy of God, because it is full and perfect for so great a patience of His. And thus the fullness and perfection of the judgment consist in nothing except the representation of the whole man. The whole man, moreover, is constituted from the combination of both substances; therefore he must be presented in both, he whom it is necessary to judge whole: for if he is not whole, he will not have lived at all. Therefore he will be judged according to the kind of life he lived, because he will be judged from what he lived. For life is the cause of judgment, to be distributed through all the substances through which it has also been lived.
Latin
Talia interim divinarum virium liniamenta non minus parabolis operato Deo, quam locuto, veniamus et ad ipsa edicta atque decreta ejus, quo cum maxime divisionem istam materiae ordinamus. Exorsi enim sumus ab auctoritate carnis, an ea sit cui dilapsae salus competat: dehinc, prosecuti de potentia Dei, an tanta sit quae salutem conferre dilapsae rei soleat: nunc, si probavimus utrumque, velim etiam de causa requiras an sit aliqua tam digna, quae resurrectionem carnis necessariam, et rationi certe omnimodo debitam vindicet, quia subest dicere, etsi caro capax restitui, etsi divinitas idonea restituendi, sed caussa restitutionis praeesse debebit. Accipe igitur et caussam, qui apud Deum discis, tam optimum, quam et justum; de suo optimum, de nostro justum. Nisi enim homo deliquisset, optimum solummodo Deum nosset, ex naturae proprietate; at nunc etiam justum eum patitur, ex caussae necessitate; tamen et hoc ipso optimum, dum et justum. Et bono enim juvando, et malo puniendo, justitiam exhibens, utramque sententiam bono praestat: hinc vindicans istud, inde remunerans illud. Sed cum Marcione plenius disces, an hoc sit Dei totum. Interim talis est noster; merito judex, quia Dominus; merito Dominus, quia auctor; merito auctor, quia Deus. Hinc et ille nescio quis haereticorum, merito non judex, non enim Deus; merito non Dominus, non enim auctor: nescio jam si Deus, qui nec auctor, quod Deus, nec Dominus, quod auctor. Igitur si Deo et Domino et auctori congruentissimum est, judicium in hominem destinare, de hoc ipso an Dominum et auctorem suum agnoscere et observare curarit, an non utique judicium resurrectio expunget. Haec erit tota caussa, imo necessitas resurrectionis; congruentissima scilicet Deo destinatio judicii: de cujus dispositione dispicias, an utrique substantiae humanae dijudicandae censura divina praesideat, tam animae quam et carni. Quod enim congruet judicari, hoc competet etiam resuscitari. Dicimus plenum primo perfectumque credendum judicium Dei, ut ultimum jam atque exinde perpetuum: ut sic quoque justum, dum non in aliquo minus: ut sic quoque Deo dignum, dum pro tanta ejus patientia, plenum atque perfectum: itaque plenitudinem perfectionemque judicii, non nisi de totius hominis repraesentatione constare. Totum porro hominem ex utriusque substantiae concretione parere; idcircoque in utraque exhibendum, quem totum oporteat judicari: qui nisi totus, utique non vixerit. Qualis ergo vixerit, talem judicari, quia de eo quod vixerit, habeat judicari. Vita est enim causa judicii; per tot substantias dispungenda, per quot et functa est.