Novatian — On the Trinity 4
IV. 1. Whom alone the Lord deservedly pronounces good, whose goodness the whole world witnesses, whom he would not have founded unless he had been good. For if all things are very good, consequently and deservedly both the good things founded have proved a good founder and those that are from a good founder cannot be other than good, from which every evil withdraws from God. 2. For it cannot be that he be initiator or craftsman of any evil work, who claims for himself the name of perfect one and parent and judge, especially since he is avenger and judge of every evil work, because evil also does not meet man from elsewhere than that he withdrew from the good God. 3. But this itself is noted in man not because it was necessary, but because he himself so willed. Whence it clearly appeared both what evil was and, lest envy seem to be in God, from whom evil had arisen, it shone forth. 4. This one therefore is always like himself and never turns or changes himself into any forms, lest through change he also seem mortal. For change of turning is understood as a portion of a certain death. Therefore neither does any addition of any part or honor ever accrue in him, lest anything ever seem to have been lacking to the perfect one, nor is any loss worked in him, lest a step of mortality seem received, but what he is, that he always is, and who he is, he always himself is, and such as he is, he always is such.
5. For both increases show an origin and losses prove death and destruction. And therefore I, he says, am God and I am not changed, always holding his standing, while that which is not born cannot be turned. 6. For this in him, whatever that can be which is God, must always be, that he always be God, preserving himself by his virtues. And therefore he says: I am who I am. For what is, for that reason has this name, because it always obtains the same quality of itself. For change takes away that name ‘what is’; for whatever is sometime turned is shown mortal by this very fact that it is turned. For it ceases to be what it had been and consequently begins to be what it was not. 7. Therefore also deservedly his standing always remains in God, while without loss of change he is always like and equal to himself. For what is not born also cannot be changed; for those things alone come into turning which are made or which are begotten, while things that sometime had not been learn to be by being born and therefore by being born are turned. But those things that have neither birth nor craftsman have shut change out from themselves, while they do not have an origin in which the cause of turning is. 8. Therefore he is also pronounced one, while he has no equal. For God, whatever he can be that is God, must necessarily be highest. But whatever is highest must finally be highest while it is without a peer. And therefore he must necessarily be alone and one, to whom nothing can be compared, while he has no equal. 9. Since neither can two infinites exist, as nature itself of things dictates. But infinite is whatever has neither origin at all nor end. For whatever has occupied the whole excludes another’s beginning. Since if it does not contain all that which is whatever is, while it is found within that by which it is contained, found less than that by which it is contained, it will have ceased to be God, reduced into another’s power, enclosed by whose greatness, by which it was lesser, and therefore what contained it will already have begun rather to be God. 10. From which it has come about that God’s own name also cannot be uttered, since it cannot even be conceived. For whatever is also comprehended from its nature’s condition is contained by a name. For a name is the signifying of that thing which could be comprehended from the name. But when that about which it is treated is such that it is not worthily gathered even by the intellects themselves, how will it be pronounced worthily by a vocabulary of appellation, which, while it is outside understanding, must necessarily also be above an appellation’s signifying? 11. So that deservedly when God for certain reasons and occasions adds and prefers his name, we may know that not so much a lawful property of appellation has been brought forth as a certain signifying has been established, to which while men run they may seem able to obtain God’s mercy through it itself. 12. He is therefore both immortal and incorruptible, sensing neither losses at all nor an end. For both because incorruptible, therefore also immortal, and because immortal, certainly also incorruptible, each intertwined with the other by mutual connection in itself and produced to eternity’s standing by reciprocal chaining, immortality descending from incorruption and incorruption coming from immortality.
Latin
IV. 1. Quem solum merito bonum pronuntiat Dominus, cuius bonitatis totus testis est mundus, quem non instituisset, nisi bonus fuisset. Nam si omnia bona ualde, consequenter ac merito et quae instituta sunt bona bonum institutorem probauerunt et quae a bono institutore sunt aliud quam bona esse non possunt, ex quo omne malum facessat a Deo. 2. Nec enim potest fieri ut sit initiator aut artifex ullius mali operis, qui nomen sibi perfecti uindicat et parentis et iudicis, maxime cum omnis mali operis uindex sit et iudex, quoniam et non aliunde occurrit homini malum, nisi a bono Deo recessisset. 3. Hoc autem ipsum in homine denotatur, non quia necesse fuit, sed quia ipse sic uoluit. Vnde manifeste et quid malum esset apparuit et, ne inuidia in Deo esse uideretur, a quo malum ortum esset, eluxit. 4. Hic ergo semper sui est similis nec se umquam in aliquas formas uertit aut mutat, ne per immutationem etiam mortalis esse uideatur. Immutatio enim conuersionis portio cuiusdam comprehenditur mortis. Ideo nec adiectio in illo umquam ullius aut partis aut honoris accedit, ne quid umquam perfecto defuisse uideatur, nec detrimentum in eo aliquod agitur, ne gradus mortalitatis receptus esse uideatur, sed quod est, id semper est, et qui est, semper ipse est, et qualis est, semper talis est.
5. Nam et incrementa originem monstrant et detrimenta mortem atque interitum probant. Et ideo Ego, ait, sum Deus et non sum mutatus, statum suum tenens semper, dum id quod natum non est conuerti non potest. 6. Hoc enim in ipso, quicquid illud potest quod est Deus, semper sit necesse est, ut semper sit Deus, seruans sese uirtutibus suis. Et ideo dicit: Ego sum qui sum. Quod enim est, ideo hoc habet nomen, quoniam eandem semper sui obtinet qualitatem. Immutatio enim tollit illud nomen 'quod est'; quicquid enim aliquando uertitur, mortale ostenditur hoc ipso quod conuertitur. Desinit enim esse quod fuerat et incipit consequenter esse quod non erat. 7. Idcirco et merito in Deo manet semper status suus, dum sine detrimento commutationis semper sui et similis et aequalis est. Quod enim natum non est, nec mutari potest; ea enim sola in conuersionem ueniunt, quaecumque fiunt uel quaecumque gignuntur, dum quae aliquando non fuerant discunt esse nascendo atque ideo nascendo conuerti. At enim illa quae nec natiuitatem habent nec artificem, excluserunt a se demutationem, dum in qua conuersionis causa est non habent originem. 8. Ideo et unus pronuntiatus est, dum parem non habet. Deus enim, quicquid esse potest quod Deus est, summum sit necesse est. Summum autem quicquid est, ita demum summum esse oportet, dum extra comparem est. Et ideo solum et unum sit necesse est, cui conferri nihil potest, dum parem non habet. 9. Quoniam nec duo infinita esse possunt, ut rerum dictat ipsa natura. Infinitum est autem quicquid nec originem habet omnino nec finem. Excludit enim alterius initium, quicquid occupauerit totum. Quoniam si non omne id quod est quicquid est continet, dum intra id inuenitur quo continetur, minus inuentum eo quo continetur, Deus esse desierit, in alterius potestatem redactus, cuius magnitudine, qua minor, fuerit inclusus, et ideo quod continuit Deus potius esse iam coeperit. 10. Ex quo effectum est ut nec nomen Dei proprium possit edici, quoniam non possit nec concipi. Id enim nomine continetur, quicquid etiam ex naturae suae condicione comprehenditur. Nomen enim significantia est eius rei quae comprehendi potuit ex nomine. At quando id de quo agitur tale est, ut condigne nec ipsis intellectibus colligatur, quomodo appellationis digne uocabulo pronuntiabitur, quod dum extra intellectum est etiam supra appellationis significantiam sit necesse est? 11. Vt merito quando nomen suum Deus ex quibusdam rationibus et occasionibus adicit et praefert, non tam legitimam proprietatem appellationis sciamus esse depromptam quam significantiam quandam constitutam, ad quam dum homines decurrunt Dei misericordiam per ipsam impetrare posse uideantur. 12. Est ergo et immortalis et incorruptibilis nec detrimenta sentiens omnino nec finem. Nam et quia incorruptibilis, ideo et immortalis, et quia immortalis, utique et incorruptibilis, utroque inuicem sibi et in se connexione mutua perplexo et ad statum aeternitatis uicaria concatenatione producto et immortalitate de incorruptione descendente et incorruptione de immortalitate ueniente.