Lactantius, Divine Institutes 3.28
Wherefore there is nothing else in life on which our reason and condition may rest except recognition of the God who generated us and religious and pious cult: whence, since the philosophers wandered, they were of course not wise. They did seek wisdom, but because they did not seek rightly they slipped farther and fell into our errors, so that they did not even hold common wisdom. For not only did they refuse to assert religion, but they even removed it, while led by the appearance of false virtue they try to free minds from every fear. Which overthrow of religion found the name of nature. For they, when either they were ignorant by whom the world was made or wished to persuade that nothing was finished by divine mind, said nature is mother of all things, as if they said all things were born of their own accord: by which word they plainly confess their imprudence. For nature, with providence and divine power removed, is absolutely nothing.
But if they call God nature, what perversity is it to name nature rather than God? But if nature is the reason or necessity or condition of being born, it is not itself sensible through itself, but there must be a divine mind which by its providence furnishes the beginning of being born to all things; or if nature is heaven and earth and all that was born, nature is not God but God's work. By not unlike error they believe fortune is as it were a certain goddess mocking human affairs with various chances, because they do not know whence goods and evils come to them. With this they think themselves matched for fighting and yet give no reason by whom and for what cause, but only boast that they duel with fortune at every moment.
Already whoever have consoled others for the death and loss of dear ones have cut the name of fortune with sharpest accusations, nor is there any dispute of theirs about virtue in which fortune is not harassed. Marcus Tullius in his Consolation says he always fought against fortune and that she was overcome by him when he stoutly beat back enemies' assaults; nor then was he broken by her when driven from home he lacked fatherland: but then, when he lost his dearest daughter, he shamefully confesses he was conquered by fortune. "I yield," he says, "and raise my hand." What more wretched than this man who so lies? "Foolishly," he says—but who professes to be wise. What then does assuming the name mean? What that contempt of things which is stretched with magnificent words? Why give precepts of wisdom at all if no one who is wise has yet been found?
And does anyone raise envy against us because we deny philosophers are wise, when they themselves confess they neither know anything nor are wise? For if ever they have so failed that they cannot even touch anything—which they do in other matters—then indeed they are reminded of ignorance and as if frantic they leap up and cry out that they are blind and senseless. Anaxagoras pronounces all things surrounded by darkness; Empedocles complains the paths of the senses are narrow; Democritus that truth lies sunk as in a certain well so deep that there is no bottom—foolish of course, as the rest. For truth is not as sunk in a well, but as on the highest peak of a lofty mountain or rather in heaven, which is most true. From this despair was born that confession of Socrates by which he said he knew nothing except this one thing, that he knows nothing; hence flowed the Academy's discipline—if discipline can be said where ignorance is both learned and taught.
Latin
Quapropter nihil est aliut in uita quo ratio, quo condicio nostra nitatur, nisi dei qui nos genuit agnitio et religiosus ac pius cultus: unde quoniam philosophi aberrauerunt, sapientes utique non fuerunt. quaesiuerunt illi quidem sapientiam, sed quia non rite quaerebant, prolapsi sunt longius et in nobis errores inciderunt, ut etiam communem sapientiam non tenerent. non enim tantum religionem adserere noluerunt, uerum etiam sustulerunt, dum specie falsae uirtutis inducti conantur animos omni metu liberare. quae religionis euersio naturae nomen inuenit. illi enim cum aut ignorarent a quo esset mundus effectus aut persuadere uellent nihil esse diuina mente perfectum, naturam esse dixerunt rerum omnium matrem, quasi dicerent omnia sua sponte esse nata: quo uerbo plane inprudentiam suam confitentur. natura enim, remota prouidentia et potestate diuina, prorsus nihil est. quodsi deum naturam uocant, quae peruersitas est naturam potius quam deum nominare? si autem natura est ratio uel necessitas uel condicio nascendi, non est per se ipsa sensibilis, sed necesse est mentem esse diuinam, quae sua prouidentia nascendi principium rebus omnibus praebeat, aut si natura est caelum atque terra et omne quod natum est, non est deus natura, sed dei opus. non dissimili errore credunt esse fortunam quasi deam quandam res humanas uariis casibus inludentem, quia nesciunt unde sibi bona et mala eueniant. cum hac se compositos ad proeliandum putant nec ullam tamen rationem reddunt a quo et quam ob causam, sed tantum cum fortuna se digladiari momentis omnibus gloriantur. iam quicumque consolati sunt alios ob interitum amissionemque carorum, fortunae nomen acerrimis accusationibus prosciderunt nec omnino ulla eorum disputatio de uirtute est, in qua non fortuna uexetur. Marcus Tullius in sua Consolatione pugnasse se semper contra fortunam loquitur eamque a se esse superatam, cum fortiter inimicorum impetus rettudisset; ne tum quidem se ab ea fractum, cum domo pulsus patria caruerit: tum autem, cum amiserit carissimam filiam, uictum se a fortuna turpiter confitetur. cedo inquit et manum tollo. quid hoc homine miserius, qui sic iaceat? insipienter inquit, sed qui se profitetur esse sapientem. quid ergo sibi uult adsumptio nominis? quid contemptus ille rerum, qui magnificis uerbis praetenditur? quid dispar ceteris habitus? aut cur omnino praecepta sapientiae datis, si nemo adhuc qui sapiat inuentus est? et quisquam nobis inuidiam facit, quia philosophos negamus esse sapientes, cum ipsi nec scire se quicquam nec sapere fateantur? nam si quando ita defecerint, ut ne adtingere quidem quicquam possint, quod faciunt in rebus ceteris, tura uero admonentur ignorantiae et quasi furibundi exiliunt et exclamant caecos esse se et excordes. Anaxagoras pronuntiat circumfusa esse tenebris omnia; Empedocles angustas esse sensuum semitas queritur, tamquam illi ad cogita-ndum reda et quadrigis opus esset; Democritus quasi in puteo quodam sic alto, ut fundus nullus sit, ueritatem iacere demersam: nimirum stulte, ut cetera. non enim tamquam in puteo demersa ueritas est, quo uel descendere uel etiam cadere illi licebat, sed tamquam in summo montis excelsi uertice uel potius in caelo, quod est uerissimum. quid est enim cur eam potius in imum depressam diceret quam in summum leuatam? nisi forte mentem quoque in pedibus aut in imis calcibus constituere malebat potius quam in pectore aut in capite. adeo remotissimi fuerunt ab ipsa ueritate, ut eos ne status quidem sui corporis admoneret ueritatem illis in summo esse quaerendam. ex hac desperatione confessio illa Socratis nata est, qua se nihil scire dixit nisi hoc unum, quod nihil sciat, hinc Academiae disciplina manauit, si tamen disciplina dici potest in qua ignoratio et discitur et docetur. sed ne illi quidem qui scientiam sibi adsumpserunt, id ipsum, quod scire se putabant, constanter defendere potuerunt. qui, quoniam ratio illis non quadrabat per ignorantiam rerum diuinarum, tam uarii, tam incerti fuerunt sibique saepe contraria disserentes, ut quid sentirent, quid uellent, statuere ac diiudicare non posses. quid igitur pugnes aduersus eos homines qui suo sibi gladio pereunt? quid labores ut eos destruas, quos sua ipsos destruit atque adfligit oratio? Aristoteles inquit Cicero ueteres philosophos os accusans ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriosissimos fuisse, qui existimauissent philosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam: sed se uidere, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, breui tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore. quod igitur fuit illut tempus? quando est aut a quibus absoluta? nam quod ait stultissimos fuisse, qui putassent ingeniis suis perfectam esse sapientiam, uerum est: sed ne ipse quidem satis prudenter, qui aut a ueteribus coeptam aut a nouis auctam [aut] mox a posterioribus perfectuiri putauit. numquam enim potest inuestigari quod non per uiam suam quaeritur.